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Abstract
Nash equilibrium (NE) and Pareto optimality (PO) are two competing criteria for ana-
lyzing games. PO, however, is less studied and understood than NE for N -player stochastic
games. Derivation of PO strategies is often implicitly identified as analyzing some associated
McKean-Vlasov controls/mean-field controls (MFCs) when N is large. This paper studies a
class of N -player stochastic games and directly derives the PO strategy. The analysis is based
on 1) formulating an auxiliary N -dimensional stochastic control problem, 2) analyzing the
regularity of its value function by adapting the classical work of [38], and 3) solving a new
class of Skorokhod problem where the free boundary is only piecewise smooth with possible
corners. Finally, it characterizes analytically the precise difference between the PO value of
the game and the value function of its associated MFC problem; and suggests that it is neces-
sary to assume weak correlation among players, as in [9], in order for the usual identification
between the PO strategy and the MFC to be asymptotically correct.
1 Introduction
There are two main criteria to analyze various strategies for N -player stochastic games: Nash
Equilibrium (NE) and Pareto Optimality (PO). NE is most commonly used for analyzing stability
of competitive games, whereas PO is widely adopted to analyze the efficiency and social optimality
for strategies in collaborative games.
Unlike NE, however, studies of PO strategies for N -player collaborative stochastic games are
very limited. The main difficulty lies in analyzing the associated high-dimensional Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. [1] considered a two-player game in an impulse control frame-
work between a representative energy consumer and a representative electricity producer, and
derived an asymptotic PO solution. [18] solved explicitly a mean-variance portfolio optimization
problem with N stocks. [17] considered a problem of public good contribution and was the first
to directly analyze the PO strategy for an N -player stochastic game with singular controls. A
similar problem was studied and a semi-analytical solution was derived by [39] in a regular control
framework.
When N is large, study of N -player stochastic games under PO is often implicitly identified
as analyzing an associated McKean-Vlasov/mean-field control (MFC) problem [37]. However,
the relation between N -player games under PO and MFC is much less understood, compared to
the relation between N-player games under NE and mean-field-games (MFGs). Indeed, for the
latter, [27] showed that the value function of an N -player game under NE can be approximated
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by the value function of an associated MFG with an error of order 1√
N
. For higher order error
analysis including the central limit theorem and the large deviation principle for MFGs, [13] and
[14] studied diffusion-based models with common noise via the coupling approach, and [5] and [10]
analyzed finite state space models without common noise using master equations. See [8] and the
references therein for more details on MFG . In contrast, the precise difference between the PO
value of an N -player game and the value function of its associated MFC is unclear, except for the
convergence from the former to the latter in [26], and the convergence of the empirical distribution
under the PO strategy for an N -player game to the distribution of the optimally controlled MFC
dynamics in [18], [19], and [31]. The exact error of these approximations, however, remains unclear.
Our work. This paper studies a class of N -player stochastic games (N-Player) and explores the
mathematical structure of PO strategy for this game. The key idea is to formulate and analyze
the regularity property of the value function for an auxiliary N -dimensional stochastic control
problem. This control problem is also referred to as a “central controller” problem, because the
PO strategy of the game would be derived from the optimal control of this problem, as if game
strategies among players were assigned and coordinated by a central controller. The approach in
the regularity study is inspired by the classical work of [38]. However, the gradient constraint
in the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation for the value function in this paper is different,
as it involves a maximum operator. This term is new and comes from game interactions among
players. Therefore, the analysis is subtler. Consequently, the value function is less smooth.
After the regularity study, the derivation of the PO strategy is then translated into solving a
class of corresponding Skorokhod problem. This Skorokhod problem, to the best of our knowledge,
is also new as the free boundary is only piecewise smooth with possible corners, due to the less
degree of smoothness of the value function. Our approach is to construct a sequence of ǫ-optimal
policies for the Skorokhod problem with smooth boundaries. This approach is fairly natural and
intuitive; the analysis, however, is more involved and requires additional consistency property to
ensure that the optimally controlled dynamics will not be stuck at the corner of the free boundary.
The final part of the paper focuses on characterizing the precise difference between the PO value
of the game and the value function of its associated MFC problem. This difference is established
in terms of the covariance structure between the optimally controlled dynamics of players and
characteristics of the non-action region in the game. This result helps explain why PO strategies
of stochastic games are often implicitly identified as MFCs. Moreover, it demonstrates that in
order for this identification to be asymptotically correct, it is necessary to assumes that there is
a weak correlation among players. Note that this assumption was indeed commonly adopted for
MFCs, for example, in [9].
Related works. From the perspective of stochastic games, the idea to connect PO strategies
of stochastic games with central controllers’ control problems is not new. This idea can be traced
back to the economic theory on mechanism design and social welfare optimization in [4] and [11].
Note this very same idea was also adopted in [17], which considered the problem of public good
contribution in the framework of a continuous-time stochastic differential game.
The class of N -player game presented in this paper was first studied in [23] under the criterion
of NE. The mathematical problems and solution approaches in this paper are different. In partic-
ular, the analysis for PO strategy is more complicated: it consists of the regularity study of the
value function for a new N -dimensional control problem, and a new class of Skorokhod problem
with only piecewise-smooth boundaries.
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Organization. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the mathematical set up of
the N -player stochastic game, and connects the N -player game with the auxiliary control problem.
Section 3 provides detailed analysis for the auxiliary control problem and for the construction of
the optimal control. Section 4 relates the PO value of the N -player game with the value function
of an appropriate MFC problem.
2 Mathematical Formulation of the Game
In this section, we will provide the mathematical framework of the N -player game.
Controlled dynamics. Let (Xit)t≥0 ∈ R denote the state of player i at time t, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . In
the absence of controls, X t := (X
1
t , . . . ,X
N
t ) ∈ RN is
X t =X 0 +µt+ σB t, X 0 = (x
1, . . . , xN ), (2.1)
where B := (B1, . . . , BN ) ∈ RN is an N -dimensional Brownian motion in an appropriate filtered
probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P), with a drift µ := (µ1, . . . , µN ) ∈ RN and a covariance matrix
σ := (σij)1≤i,j≤N ∈ RN×N . Here µi, σij are constants with σσT positive definite.
When player i applies controls of a finite variation type ξit to X
i
t , then X
i
t evolves as
dXit = µ
idt+ σi · dB t + dξit , Xi0− = xi, i = 1, . . . , N,
where σi is the ith row of the covariance matrix σ.
Denote the pair of non-decreasing and càdlàg processes (ξi+, ξi−) as the minimum decomposi-
tion of the finite variation process ξi := (ξit)t≥0 such that ξi := ξi+−ξi−, then the above controlled
dynamics can be written as
dXit = µ
idt+ σ i · dB t + dξi,+t − dξi,−t , Xi0− = xi. (2.2)
Note that ξi+ and ξi− can be further decomposed into a differential form,
dξi±t = d(ξ
i±
t )
c +∆ξi±t ,
with d(ξi±t )
c and ∆ξi±t := ξ
i±
t − ξi±t− the continuous and jump parts of dξi±t , respectively.
Game objective. In this game, player i chooses (ξi+, ξi−) from an appropriate admissible
control set U iN (to be specified below), in order to minimize over an infinite time horizon the
following objective function,
J i(x;ξ) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
hi(X t)dt+K
+
i dξ
i,+
t +K
−
i dξ
i,−
t
]
. (N-player)
Here α > 0 is a constant discount factor, K+i ,K
−
i > 0 are the cost of controls, and h
i(x) : RN →
R+ is the running cost function.
The interaction among players is through the cost function hi(x). Take for example, hi(x)
in the form of h
(
xi − ρ
∑N
j=1 x
j
N
)
with ρ ∈ [0, 1] and h(x) : R → R+, then in this game players
exercise appropriate controls to stay as close as possible to each other during the game. (See [2]
and [6] for games with similar running cost functions.) We will use this particular form in Section
4 when connecting the PO value of game (N-player) and value function of the associated MFC
problem.
3
Admissible control U iN . The admissible control set for player i is defined as
U iN =
{
(ξi,+t , ξ
i,−
t ) | ξi,+t and ξi,−t are Ft-progressively measurable, càdlàg non-decreasing,
with E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtdξi,+t
]
<∞,E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtdξi,−t
]
<∞, ξi,+0− = 0, ξi,−0− = 0
}
.
(2.3)
Here we look for adapted control ξ t ∈ Ft with Markovian structure. That is, ({Bs}s∈[0,t], ξ t) is
jointly Markovian. See also [17] for games with open-loop singular controls and [12] and [30] for
game with Markovian singular controls.
We will analyze game (N-player) under the criterion of PO. Recall
Definition 1 (PO). Given game (N-player), ξ∗ ∈ UN := (U1N , · · · ,UNN ) with pay-off functions(
J1 (x;ξ∗) , . . . , JN (x;ξ∗)
)
is a PO strategy if and only if there does not exist ξ ∈ UN such that
J i (x;ξ) ≤ J i (x;ξ∗) , for all i = 1, . . . , N,
and
J j (x;ξ) < J j (x;ξ∗) , for some j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.(
J1 (x;ξ∗) , . . . , JN (x;ξ∗)
)
is called the PO value (associated with the PO strategy ξ∗).
To derive the PO strategy and PO value for game (N-player), we consider an auxiliary N -
dimensional stochastic control problem of the following form
v(x) = min
ξ∈UN
J(x;ξ), (2.4)
where the pay-off function J(x;ξ) is the weighted average of pay-off functions of all players such
that
J(x;ξ) =
N∑
i=1
αiJ
i(x,ξ)
= E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
H(X t)dt+
N∑
i=1
αiK
+
i dξ
i,+
t +
N∑
i=1
αiK
−
i dξ
i,−
t
]
.
Here the dynamics of X t is the same as in (2.2), and
H(x) :=
N∑
i=1
αih
i(x), with αi > 0 and
N∑
i=1
αi = 1. (2.5)
In the special case of αi =
1
N (i = 1, 2, · · · , N), all players are treated equally. This is usually
assumed in the social welfare optimization problem [11].
We will need some technical conditions to ensure the well-definedness of game (N-player).
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Assumptions. There exist C > c > 0 such that H(x) and hi(x) (i = 1, 2, · · · , N) satisfy the
following conditions,
A1. ∀x ∈ RN , 0 ≤ H(x) ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖2).
A2. ∀x,x′ ∈ RN , |H(x)−H(x′)| ≤ C(1 + ‖x‖+ ‖x′‖)‖x − x′‖.
A3. H(x) ∈ C2(RN ), H is convex, with 0 < c ≤ ∂2H(x)
∂z2
≤ C for all unit direction z ∈ RN .
For example, H(x) = 1N
∑N
i=1 h
(
xi − ρ
∑
j 6=i x
j
N−1
)
with ρ ∈ (0, 1) satisfies Assumptions A1-A3.
Under these assumptions, we will establish the existence of the optimal control to problem
(2.4). This optimal control yields a PO strategy for game (N-player).
To see how the optimal control of problem (2.4) yields a PO strategy of game (N-player), take
the payoff function J i in (N-player), v(x) the value function in (2.4), and the optimal control
ξ∗ := (ξ1∗, . . . , ξN∗), if exists, to problem (2.4), then for any ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξN ) ∈ UN ,
N∑
i=1
αiJ i(x;ξ) ≥ v(x), (2.6)
where value v(x) is reached when player i takes the control ξi∗t (i = 1, 2, . . . , N).
If there is another ξ ′ := (ξ1
′
, . . . , ξN
′
) ∈ UN and k ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that
Jk(x; ξ1
′
, . . . , ξN
′
) < Jk(x; ξ1∗, . . . , ξN∗),
then given αi > 0 for all i, there must exists j ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that
J j(x; ξ1
′
, . . . , ξN
′
) > J j(x; ξ1∗, . . . , ξN∗).
Hence the control ξ∗ is a PO strategy by definition. That is,
Theorem 2. Assume A1-A3. Then the optimal control of the auxiliary control problem (2.4)
yields a PO strategy for game (N-player).
The above analysis shows that if the optimal control of problem (2.4) exists, then it forms a
PO strategy. Indeed, A1-A3 guarantees the existence of optimal control. This will be shown in
Section 3.
Remark 3 (Equivalent form of problem (2.4)). v(x) defined in (2.4) is the optimal value for the
central controller when the initial state is fixed as x (X 0− := x). In the case that players start
with a random position X 0− = Z ∼ PZ where random variable Z ∈ RN is square-integrable, then
the corresponding value function u(PZ ) with initial position Z can be written as
u(PZ ) = EZ∼PZ [v(Z )] .
This connection was also discussed in [3], [23], and [32].
3 Analysis of the Auxiliary Controller Problem and Derivation of
PO
Given Theorem 2, we now focus on the auxiliary control problem (2.4), in order to derive the PO
strategy of the game (N-player).
We first analyze the regularity properties of the value function v(x), which is necessary for
establishing the existence and uniqueness of the optimal control.
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3.1 Regularity Analysis of the Auxiliary Controller Problem.
Theorem 4 (Regularity of v(x)). Under Assumptions A1- A3, the value function v(x) to the
control problem (2.4) is the unique W2,∞
loc
(RN ) solution to the following HJB equation
max{αu− Lu−H(x), β(∇u) − 1} = 0, (3.1)
with the operator L = 12
∑N
i,j=1σ
i · σj ∂2
∂xi∂xj
+
∑N
i=1 µ
i ∂
∂xi
, and
β(q) = max
1≤i≤N
[(
qi
αiK
−
i
)+
∨
(
qi
αiK
+
i
)−]
, (3.2)
where q := (q1, · · · , qN ), (a)+ = max{0, a} and (a)− = max{0,−a} for any a ∈ R. Moreover,
there exists K > 0 such that
(i) 0 ≤ v(x) ≤ K(1 + ‖x‖2), ∀x ∈ RN ,
(ii) |v(x)− v(x′)| ≤ K(1 + ‖x‖+ ‖x′‖)‖x − x′‖, ∀x,x′ ∈ RN ,
(iii) 0 ≤ ∂2
∂z2
v(x) ≤ K for any second order directional derivative ∂2
∂z2
.
Finally, define the continuation/no-action region CN as
CN = {x | β(∇v(x)) < 1} . (3.3)
Then, CN is bounded and v(x) ∈ C4,α(CN ).
The proof of Theorem 4 is inspired by the approach in [38, Theorem 4.5]. In [38], the following
HJB equation (3.4) is studied for an N -dimensional control problem:
max

αu− Lu−H(x),
√√√√ N∑
i=1
(∇iu)2 − 1

 = 0. (3.4)
Comparing the gradient constraints in (3.4) with (3.1), it is clear that the operator β(φ) in (3.1)
is less regular than ‖∇u‖2 in (3.4) as ‖∇u(·)‖2 has smoother and gradual changes in the state
space RN .
Note also a similar HJB equation appeared in [35] for establishing the convergence of control
problems with a finite variation from control problems with a bounded velocity. Our analysis
in this paper focuses on the regularity of the value function and the solution of the Skorokhod
problem for the PO strategy.
Before establishing Theorem 4, first recall
Definition 5 (Viscosity Solution). v is a continuous viscosity solution to (3.1) on RN if
• Viscosity super-solution: ∀x0 ∈ RN , ∀φ ∈ C2(RN ) s.t. x0 is a local minimum of (v−φ)(x)
with v(x0) = φ(x0),
max{αφ −Lφ−H(x), β(∇φ) − 1} ≥ 0.
• Viscosity sub-solution: ∀x0 ∈ RN , ∀φ ∈ C2(RN ) s.t. x0 is a local maximum of (v−φ)(x)
with v(x0) = φ(x0),
max{αφ −Lφ−H(x), β(∇φ) − 1} ≤ 0.
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Proof of Theorem 4. The proof involves several steps. The first step is to show the value function
in (2.4) is a viscosity solution to the HJB equation (3.1). This step generalizes the result [22,
Theorem 5.1] to higher dimensions. The second step is to show the value function in (2.4) isW2,∞loc .
The third step is to show the HJB system (3.1) has a unique W2,∞loc solution. For simplicity, K
will be used in the proof for generic positive constants which may represent different constants for
different estimates.
Step 1. Note that H is convex and the cost is linear in control, therefore v is convex.
Sub-solution. Consider the following controls: ξi,−t = 0 and
ξi,+t =
{
0, t = 0,
η+i , ≥ 0,
where 0 ≤ η+i ≤ ǫ. Define the exit time
τǫ := inf{t ≥ 0,X t /∈ B¯ǫ(x0)}.
Note that X has at most one jump at t = 0 and is continuous on [0, τǫ). By the dynamic
programming principle (DPP),
φ(x0) = v(x0) ≤ E
∫ τǫ∧h
0
e−αt
[
H(X t)dt+
N∑
i=1
K+i dξ
i,+
t
]
+ E
[
e−α(τǫ∧h)φ(X τǫ∧h)
]
. (3.5)
Applying Itô’s formula to the process e−αtφ(X t) between 0 and τǫ ∧ h, and taking expectation,
we obtain
E
[
e−α(τǫ∧h)φ(X τǫ∧h)
]
= φ(x0) + E
[∫ τǫ∧h
0
e−αt(−αφ+ Lφ)(X t)dt
]
+ E

 ∑
0≤t≤τǫ∧h
[φ(X t)− φ(X t−)]

 . (3.6)
Combining (3.5) and (3.6), we have
E
[∫ τǫ∧h
0
e−αt(αφ− Lφ−H)(X t)dt
]
− E
[∫ τǫ∧h
0
e−αt(
N∑
i=1
Ki,+dξi,+t )
]
− E

 ∑
0≤t≤τǫ∧h
φ(X t)− φ(X t−)

 ≤ 0 (3.7)
• Taking first η+i = 0 for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N , i.e., ξi,+ = ξi,− = 0, we see X is continuous, and
only the first term in the LHS of (3.7) is nonzero. Dividing the above inequality (3.7) by h
and letting h→ 0, then by the dominated convergence theorem,
αφ(x0)− Lφ(x0)−H(x0) ≤ 0.
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• Now, by taking ηi,+ > 0 and ηj,+ = 0 for j 6= i in (3.7), and noting that ξi,+ and X jump
only at t = 0 with size ηi,+, we get[∫ τǫ∧h
0
e−αt(αφ −Lφ−H)(X t)dt
]
−Ki,+ηi,+ − φ(x0 + ηi,+ei) + φ(x0) ≤ 0.
Taking h→ 0, then dividing by ηi,+ and letting η → 0, we have
−Ki,+ ≤ ∇xiφ(x).
• Meanwhile, taking an admissible control such that ξi,+ = 0 and
ξi,−t =
{
0, t = 0,
η−i , ≥ 0,
where 0 ≤ η−i ≤ ǫ. By a similar argument, we have
∇xiφ(x) ≤ Ki,−,
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
This proves the sub-solution viscosity property
max{αφ− Lφ−H(x), β(∇φ) − 1} ≤ 0.
Super-solution. This part is proved by contradiction. Suppose the claim is not true. Then
there exist x0 ∈ RN , ǫ > 0, φ(x) ∈ C2(RN ) with φ(x0) = v(x0) and v ≥ φ in B¯ǫ(x0) and ν > 0
such that for all x ∈ B¯ǫ(x0),
αφ(x0)− Lφ(x0)−H(x0) ≤ −ν, (3.8)
and
−K+i + ν ≤ ∇xiφ ≤ K−i − ν. (3.9)
Given any admissible control ξ , consider the exit time τǫ = inf{t ≥ 0,X t /∈ B¯ǫ(x0)}. Applying
Itô’s formula [36, Theorem 21] to e−αtφ(x) and any semi-martingale {X t}t≥0 under admissible
control (ξi,+, ξi,−)Ni=1 leads to
E
[
e−ατǫφ(X τǫ−)
]
= φ(x0) + E
[∫ τǫ
0
e−αt(−αφ+ Lφ)(X t)dt
]
+ E
[∫ τǫ
0
e−αt
N∑
i=1
∇xiφ(X t)[(dξi,+t )c − (dξi,−t )c]
]
+ E

 ∑
0≤t<τǫ
e−αt[φ(X t)− φ(X t−)]

 .
Note that for all 0 ≤ t < τǫ, X t ∈ B¯ǫ(x0). Then, by (3.8), and noting that ∆Xit = ∆ξi,+t −∆ξi,−t ,
we have for all 0 ≤ t < τǫ,
φ(X t)− φ(X t−) =
N∑
i=1
∆Xit
∫ 1
0
∇xiφ(X t + z∆X t)dz ≤
N∑
i=1
[
(K−i − ν)∆ξi,+t + (K+i − ν)∆ξi,−t
]
.
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Similarly,
φ(X t)− φ(X t−) ≥
N∑
i=1
[
−(K−i − ν)∆ξi,−t − (K+i − ν)∆ξi,+t
]
. (3.10)
In light of relations (3.8)-(3.10),
E
[
e−ατǫφ(X τǫ−)
] ≥ φ(x0) + E
[∫ τǫ
0
e−αt(−H + ν)(X t)dt
]
+ E
[∫ τǫ−
0
e−αt
N∑
i=1
−(K+i − ν)dξi,+t − (K−i − ν)dξi,−t
]
= φ(x0) − E
∫ τǫ
0
e−αt
[
H(X t)dt+
N∑
i=1
K+i dξ
i,+
t +
N∑
i=1
K−i dξ
i,−
t
]
+
N∑
i=1
(
E
[
e−ατǫK+i ∆ξ
i,+
τǫ
]
+ E
[
e−ατǫK−i ∆ξ
i,−
τǫ
])
+ ν
{
E
[∫ τǫ
0
e−αtdt
]
+ E
[∫ τǫ−
0
e−αt(dξi,+t + dξ
i,−
t )
]}
.(3.11)
Note that X τǫ− ∈ B¯ǫ(x0), X τǫ is either on the boundary ∂Bǫ(x0) or out of B¯ǫ(x0). However,
there is some random variable δ valued in [0, 1] such that
xδ =X τǫ− + δ∆X τǫ =X τǫ− + δ(∆ξ
+
t −∆ξ−t ) ∈ ∂B¯ǫ(x0).
Then similar to (3.10), we have
φ(xδ)− φ(X τǫ−) ≥ δ
N∑
i=1
[−(K−i − ν)∆ξi,−τǫ − (K+i − ν)∆ξi,+τǫ ] . (3.12)
Note that X τǫ = xδ + (1− δ)(∆ξ+t −∆ξ−t ), thus
v(xδ) ≤ (1− δ)
N∑
i=1
(
K+i ∆ξ
i,+
τǫ +K
−
i ∆ξ
i,−
τǫ
)
+ v(X τǫ). (3.13)
Recalling that v(xδ) ≥ φ(xδ), inequalities (3.12)-(3.13) imply
(1−δ)
N∑
i=1
(
K+i ∆ξ
i,+
τǫ +K
−
i ∆ξ
i,−
τǫ
)
+v(X τǫ) ≥ φ(X τǫ−)+δ
N∑
i=1
[−(K−i − ν)∆ξi,−τǫ − (K+i − ν)∆ξi,+τǫ ] .
Therefore,
N∑
i=1
(
(K+i − δν)∆ξi,+τǫ + (K−i − δν)∆ξi,−τǫ
)
+ v(X τǫ) ≥ φ(X τǫ−).
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Plugging the last inequality into (3.11), along with φ(x0) = v(x0), yields
Ee−τǫ
[
N∑
i=1
(
(K+i − δν)∆ξi,+τǫ + (K−i − δν)∆ξi,−τǫ
)
+ v(X τǫ)
]
≥ v(x0)− E
∫ τǫ
0
e−αt
[
H(X t)dt+
N∑
i=1
K+i dξ
i,+
t +
N∑
i=1
K−i dξ
i,−
t
]
+
N∑
i=1
(
E
[
e−ατǫK+i ∆ξ
i,+
τǫ
]
+ E
[
e−ατǫK−i ∆ξ
i,−
τǫ
])
+ ν
{
E
[∫ τǫ
0
e−αtdt
]
+ E
[∫ τǫ−
0
e−αt(dξi,+t + dξ
i,−
t )
]}
.
Hence
Ee−τǫv(X τǫ) + E
∫ τǫ
0
e−αt
[
H(X t)dt+
N∑
i=1
K+i dξ
i,+
t +
N∑
i=1
K−i dξ
i,−
t
]
≥ v(x0) + ν
{
E
[∫ τǫ
0
e−αtdt
]
+ E
[∫ τǫ−
0
e−αt(dξi,+t + dξ
i,−
t )
]
+ δE
[
e−τǫ∆ξi,+τǫ + e
−τǫ∆ξi,−τǫ
]}
.
We now claim that there exists a constant g0 > 0 such that for all admissible control ξ ,
E
[∫ τǫ
0
e−αtdt
]
+ E
[∫ τǫ−
0
e−αt(dξi,+t + dξ
i,−
t )
]
+ δE
[
e−τǫ∆ξi,+τǫ + e
−τǫ∆ξi,−τǫ
] ≥ g0. (3.14)
Indeed, one can always find some constant G0 such that the C2 function
ψ(x) = G0((x − x0)2 − ǫ2)
satisfies {
mini{αψ − Lψ + 1, 1− |∇xiψ|} ≥ 0, on B¯ǫ(x0),
ψ = 0 on ∂B¯ǫ(x0).
Applying Meyer’s version of Itô’s formula [36, Theorem 21] to e−αtψ(x) and any semi-martingale
{X t}t≥0 under admissible control (ξi,+, ξi,−)Ni=1 leads to
E
[
e−ατǫψ(X τǫ−)
] ≤ ψ(x0) + E
[∫ τǫ
0
e−αtdt
]
+
N∑
i=1
E
[∫ τǫ−
0
e−αt(dξi,+t + dξ
i,−
t )
]
. (3.15)
Since ψxi(x0) ≥ −1 for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
ψ(X τǫ−)− ψ(xα) ≥ −∇ψ(X τǫ− − xα) ≥ −δ
N∑
i=1
∆ξi,−τǫ .
This, combined with (3.15), yields
E
[∫ τǫ
0
e−αtdt
]
+
N∑
i=1
E
[∫ τǫ−
0
(dξi,+t + dξ
i,−
t )
]
+ E
[
e−ατǫδ
N∑
i=1
∆ξi,−τǫ
]
≥ E [e−ατǫψ(xδ)]− ψ(x0) = G0ǫ2.
Hence (3.14) holds with g0 = G0ǫ
2.
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Step 2. First, v(x) ≥ 0 is clear by the non-negativity of H(x). Moreover, by the property that
σσT ≥ aI, it follows from a known estimate and the martingale argument [34, (2.15)] that the
solution {X˜ t}t≥0 := {x +µt+σB t}t≥0 with ξ = 0 satisfies
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt‖X˜ t‖2dt ≤ K(1 + ‖x‖2), ∀x ∈ RN ,
for some constant K > 0. By Assumption A1, there exists some constant K > 0 such that
v(x) ≤ J(x,0) ≤ K(1 + ‖x‖2),∀x ∈ RN .
Thus (i) of Theorem 4 is established.
Step 3. For each fixed x ∈ RN , let
Ux = {ξ ∈ U : J(x,ξ) ≤ J(x; 0)}. (3.16)
By Assumption A1,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt‖X t‖2dt ≤ K(1 + ‖x‖2), ∀x ∈ RN , ξ ∈ Ux. (3.17)
For ξ ∈ Ux, it is easy to verify that
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt‖ξ t‖2dt ≤ K(1 + ‖x‖2), (3.18)
and
|v(x)− v(x′)| ≤ sup{|J(x;ξ)− J(x′;ξ)| : ξ ∈ Ux ∪ Ux′} ,∀x,x′ ∈ RN .
Meanwhile,
|J(x;ξ)− J(x′;ξ)| ≤ E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt|H(Xxt )−H(Xx
′
t )|dt.
Statement (ii) for v follows by Assumption A2, along with the facts that Xxt −Xx
′
t = x−x′ and
that for any ξ ∈ Ux ∪ Ux′ ,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt‖Xxt ‖dt ≤ K(1 + ‖x‖+ ‖x′‖), (3.19)
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt‖Xx′t ‖dt ≤ K(1 + ‖x‖+ ‖x′‖).
In fact, if ξ ∈ Ux, (3.19) follows immediately from (3.18) by the Hölder inequality. Meanwhile, if
ξ ∈ Ux′ , (3.19) holds because
‖Xxt ‖ ≤ ‖Xx
′
t ‖+ ‖x − x′‖ ≤ ‖Xx
′
t ‖+ ‖x‖+ ‖x′‖.
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Step 4. For i = 1, 2, · · · , N , let ∆ix := (0, · · · , 0,∆xi, 0, · · · , 0) be the N-dimensional row vector
with the i-th entry being ∆xi. For any function F : RN → R, define the second difference of F in
the xi direction by
δ2i F (x) = F (x +∆ix) + F (x −∆ix)− 2F (x). (3.20)
It is easy to check that
δ2i v(x) ≤ sup{δ2i J (x;ξ) : ξ ∈ Ux}. (3.21)
Since H ∈ C2(RN ), for x ∈ RN ,
δ2iH(x) = (∆x
i)2
∫ 1
0
∫ λ
−λ
∂2H
∂(xi)2
(x1, . . . , xi + µ∆xi, . . . , xN )dµdλ. (3.22)
By Assumption A3,
δ2iH(x) ≤ K(∆xi)2
∫ 1
0
∫ λ
−λ
dµdλ = (∆xi)2K. (3.23)
Hence
0 ≤ δ2i v(x) ≤ K(∆xi)2, x ∈ RN , |∆xi| ≤ 1. (3.24)
To prove the lower bound of (3.24), it suffices to prove the convexity of v, which follows from
the joint convexity of J(x;ξ) in the following sense:
J(θx + (1− θ)x′) ≤ θJ(x;ξ) + (1− θ)J(x′;ξ ′), (3.25)
for any x,x′ ∈ RN and any ξ,ξ ′ ∈ U . The convexity of J in (x;ξ) is then obvious sinceXxt depends
linearly on (x,ξ) and the set U and the function H are both convex.
Step 5. To prove v ∈ W2,∞loc , let B be any open ball and let ψ ∈ C∞0 (RN ) be any test function
with a support contained in B. Since (∆xi)−2δ2i v(x) is bounded on B for |∆xi| ≤ 1, there is
a sequence ηk → 0+ as k → ∞ such that, denoting by gk the result of replacing ∆xi by ηk in
(∆xi)−2δ2i v(x), we have gk → Q weakly in Lp(B) for some p with 1 < p < ∞. It is then easy to
see that ∫
RN
ψ(x)Q(x)dx =
∫
RN
∂2ψ
∂xixi
v(x)dx, ∀ψ ∈ C∞0 (B). (3.26)
Here Q = ∂
2v
∂xixi
is the generalized derivative. The existence and local boundedness of mixed second
order generalized derivatives are now immediate: for k = 1, 2, . . . , N , let ek denote the unit vector
in the direction of the positive xk axis, for any fixed i 6= j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , let y be a new
coordinate whose axis points in the
ei+ej√
2
direction, then ∂
2v
∂xi∂xj
= ∂
2v
∂y2
− 12 ( ∂
2v
∂xixi
+ ∂
2v
∂xjxj
).
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Step 6. To show that v is the unique solution to HJB, we proceed by a contradiction argument.
Suppose v1 and v2 are two non-negative solutions. Let y0 be the point where v2 attains its
minimum value. Given δ > 0, define
φδ(x) := v1(x)− v2(x)− δ‖x − y0‖2, ∀x ∈ RN .
The function φδ attains its maximum at some xδ ∈ RN and
0 = ∇φδ(xδ) = ∇v1(x)−∇v2(x)− 2δ(xδ − y0). (3.27)
This leads to
∇v1(xδ) = ∇v2(xδ) + 2δ(xδ − y0).
Consequently,
1 ≥ β(∇v1(xδ)) = β(∇v2(xδ) + 2δ(xδ − y0)).
Since y0 is the minimal point of v2, we have
∇v2(xδ) · (xδ − y0) ≥ 0.
This means that either β(∆v2(xδ)) < 1, or for any i ∈ argmax β(∇v2(xδ)), (xδ − y0)i = 0.
Suppose the latter, then by (3.27),
0 = Div1(xδ)−Div2(xδ)− 2δ(xδ − y0)i.
Hence
Div1(xδ) = Div2(xδ) = 0,
for i ∈ argmax β(∇v2(xδ)). This implies β(∆v2(xδ)) < 1. Meanwhile from (3.1), we know
∆v2(xδ) = v2(xδ)−H(xδ).
By Bony’s maximum principle [33],
0 ≥ lim inf essx→xδ∆φδ(x)
= lim inf essx→xδ∆v1(x)−∆v2(x)− 4δ
≥ v1(xδ)− v2(xδ)− 4δ.
It follows that for any x ∈ RN ,
v1(x)− v2(x) = φδ(x) + δ‖x − y0‖2 ≤ φδ(xδ) + δ‖x − y0‖2 ≤ δ(4 + ‖x − y0‖2).
Letting δ → 0, we have v1(x) ≤ v2(x). Similarly, we have v2(x) ≤ v1(x).
Finally, let B be any open ball such that B¯ ∈ C. By Theorem 6.13 in [20], the Dirichlet
problem in B,
{
αv˜ − Lv˜ = H(x), ∀x ∈ B,
v˜ = v, ∀x ∈ ∂B, (3.28)
has a solution v˜ ∈ C0(B¯) ∩ C2,α(B). In particular, v˜ − v ∈ W2,∞(B), therefore by (3.28), v˜ − v ∈
W1,20 (B). By Theorem 8.9 of [20], v = v˜ in B, thus v ∈ C2,α(B). By Theorem 6.17 of [20],
v ∈ C4,α(B) thus v ∈ C4,α(CN ) for all α ∈ (0, 1).
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3.2 PO strategy
Now, given the regularity of the value function, the existence of the optimal control to (2.4) is
straightforward according to [35]. To ensure the existence of a unique PO strategy, we impose the
following assumption on the value function v.
A4. The diagonal dominates the row/column in the Hessian matrix ∇2v. That is,
vxixi(x)>
∑
j 6=i
|vxixj (x)| ,∀i,= 1, 2, · · · , N and x ∈ CN . (3.29)
Note that a similar assumption was used in [21, Assumption 3] to analyze NE strategies.
Given this additional assumption and the regularity of the value function, we will next char-
acterize the PO strategy to game (N-player). We will show that when x ∈ CN , the optimal
strategy can be constructed by formulating and solving a sequence of Skorokhod problems with
piece-wise C1 boundaries, and then by passing to the limit of this sequence of ǫ-optimal policies.
We will also show that the reflection field of the Skorokhod problem can be extended to the entire
state space under appropriate conditions, completing the construction of the PO strategy when x
is outside CN .
Note that this idea of ǫ-optimal policy was first explored in [29] for a high-dimensional control
problem introduced in [38].
3.2.1 PO strategy when x ∈ CN
First, recall,
Definition 6 (Skorokhod Problem). Let G be an open domain in RN with S = ∂G. Let x ∈ G¯
and r be a unit vector field defined on S. That is, for each y ∈ S, |r(y)| = 1 and r points inside G
(thus nontangential to S). We say that a continuous process
ξ t =
∫ t
0
N sdηs, (3.30)
with ηt =
∨
[0,t] ξ, is a solution to a Skorokhod problem with data (x +µt+ σB t, G,r,x) if
(a) |N t| = 1, ηt is continuous and nondecreasing;
(b) the process X t = x +µt+ σB t +
∫ t
0 N sdηs satisfies X t ∈ G¯, 0 ≤ t <∞, a.s;
(c) for every 0 ≤ t <∞,
ηt =
∫ t
0
1(Xs∈∂G,N s=r(X s))dηs.
Now let us define some notations for the Skorokhod problem associated with the region CN .
By (3.3),
CN = {x | β(∇v(x)) < 1} = ∩2Nj=1Gj , (3.31)
where (i = 1, 2, · · · , N),
Gi = {x | vxi(x) < αiK−i },
Gi+N = {x | vxi(x) > −αiK+i }. (3.32)
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Denote S = ∂CN as the boundary of CN , I(x) = {j | x /∈ Gj , j = 1, 2, · · · , 2N} as the boundary
x lines on, and define the vector field γj on each face Gj as
γi = −ei,
γi+N = ei,
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , where ei = (0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0) with the ith component being 1. Then the
directions of reflection is defined as
r(x) =


∑
j∈I(x)
cjγj(x) : ci ≥ 0 and
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈I(x)
cjγj(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1

 . (3.33)
Theorem 7 (Optimal Policy). Take x ∈ CN , and assume A1- A4. Then the unique optimal
control ξ∗ to problem (2.4) exits, which is a solution to the Skorokhod problem (6) with data
(x+µt+σB t, CN , r(.),x) such that X ∗t ∈ CN . Moreover, the optimal policy acts only on ∂CN , and
its push direction is in r(x).
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof consists of four steps.
Step 1: Skorokhod problem with piece-wise smooth boundary. We first construct an
approximation Cǫ of CN with piecewise C1 boundaries. Clearly, if ∂CN itself is piece-wise C1, the
Cǫ = CN .
Let φδ(x) ∈ C∞(RN ,R+) be such that φδ(x) = 0 for |x| ≥ δ and∫
RN
φδ(x)dx = 1. (3.34)
Since v(x) ∈ W2,∞loc (RN ), consider a regularization of v(x) via φǫ, such that
vδ(x) = φδ ∗ v(x). (3.35)
The boundedness of v, ∇v, D2v on BR(0), with CN ⊂ BR−1(0), implies that Hδ, vδ are bounded
uniformly on CN for δ < 1, and
vδ → v, ∇vδ → ∇v, Hδ → H uniformly in CN .
Denote Kmax = maxi=1,2,··· ,N{αiK+i , αiK−i }, Kmin = mini=1,2,··· ,N{αiK+i , αiK−i } and recall K
in Theorem 4 (iii) such that 0 ≤ ∂2∂z2 v(x) ≤ K for any second order directional derivative ∂
2
∂z2 .
Then, for any ǫk ∈ (0, 14), there exists δk := δk(ǫk) ∈
(
0, ǫkKminK
)
such that for all δ ∈ [0, δk ],
‖∇vδ − ∇v‖L1 < Kminǫk. Take a non-negative and non-increasing sequence {ǫk}k such that
limk→∞ ǫk = 0. Denote wδk(x) = β(∇vδk(x)) and Cǫk := {x | wδk(x) < 1 − 2ǫk} = ∩2Nj=1Gǫkj ,
where i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
Gǫki = {x | vδkxi (x) < (1− 2ǫk)αiK−i },
Gǫki+N = {x | vδkxi (x) > (−1 + 2ǫk)αiK+i }. (3.36)
Since ‖∇vδk − ∇v‖L1 < Kminǫk in CN and by the definition in (3.36), we have Cǫk ⊂ CN . Also
notice that ∂Gǫkj ∩Cǫk ∈ C2 because vδk is smooth. Now, take any ǫ from the sequence {ǫk}k, and
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denote Sǫ = ∂Cǫ as the boundary of Cǫ, and Iǫ(x) =
{
j | x /∈ Gǫj , j = 1, 2, · · · , 2N
}
. Define the
vector field γj on each face G
ǫ
j as
γi = −ei,
γi+N = ei,
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , where ei = (0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0) with the ith component being 1, the directions
of reflection by
rǫ(x) =


∑
j∈Iǫ(x)
cjγj(x) : ci ≥ 0 and
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈Iǫ(x)
cjγj(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 1

 . (3.37)
When ǫ = 0, denote I(x) := I0(x) and r(x) := r0(x) for the index set and reflection cone of region
CN , respectively. Then define the normal direction on face Gǫj as nǫj (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2N) with
nǫi = −
∇vδ
xi
‖∇vδ
xi
‖2
,
nǫi+N =
∇vδxi
‖∇vδ
xi
‖2
, i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
Note that the normal direction nǫj (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2N) is well-defined by the construction of (3.36).
Next we want to show that nǫi ·γi =
vδ
xixi
‖∇vδ
xi
‖2 > 0 and n
ǫ
i+N ·γi+N =
vδ
xixi
‖∇vδ
xi
‖2 > 0 for i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
To do so, we want to show that Bδ(x) ∈ CN for x ∈ Sǫ. Note that (−1 + 2ǫ)αiK+i ≤ vxi(x) ≤
(1 − 2ǫ)αiK−i for x ∈ C¯ǫ. For any y ∈ Bδ(x), |vxi(x) − vxi(y)| ≤ K‖x − y‖ ≤ Kδ ≤ ǫKmin.
Therefore, (−1 + ǫ)αiK+i ≤ (−1 + 2ǫ)αiK+i − ǫKmin ≤ vxi(y) ≤ (1 − 2ǫ)αiK−i + ǫKmin ≤
(1 − ǫ)αiK−i . Thus, y ∈ CN for all y ∈ Bδ(x) and x ∈ Sǫ. Moreover, under Assumption A4,
vδxixi(x) =
∫
y∈Bδ(x) vxixi(x)φ
δ(x − y)dy > 0 for all x ∈ Sǫ.
Furthermore, at each point x ∈ Sǫ, there exists γ ∈ rǫ(x) pointing into Cǫ. This is because
there is no x ∈ ∂Cǫ such that i, i+N ∈ Iǫ(x) for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N . This implies |Iǫ(x)| ≤ N for
all x ∈ ∂Cǫ. Now Assumption A4 implies the following condition (3.8) in Dupuis and Ishii [16]):
the existence of scalars bj ≥ 0 j ∈ Iǫ(x), such that
bj 〈γj(x), nj(x)〉 >
∑
k∈Iǫ(x)\{i}
bk |. 〈γk(x), nk(x)〉| .
Here we can simply take bj = 1 for all j ∈ Iǫ(x). Therefore, by [16, Theorem 4.8], there exists a
solution to the Skorokhod problem with data ({x +µt+ σBt}t≥0, Cǫ, rǫ(·),x).
Step 2. ǫ-optimal policy. Now we will show that the solution to the Skorokhod problem with
data(x +µt+ σB t, Cǫ, rǫ,x) is an ǫ-optimal policy of the control problem (2.4) with
ξǫt =
∫ t
0
N ǫs · dηǫs, (3.38)
and N ǫ(x) = rǫ(x) on Sǫ.
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To see this, denote X ǫt = x + µt + σB t + ξ
ǫ
t , with ξ
ǫ
t defined in (3.38). By [16, Theorem
4.8], X ǫ is a continuous process. Since v ∈ C4,α(CN ), applying Itô’s lemma to the continuous
semi-martingale [28, Theorem 3.3.6] yields
v(x) = Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αt [H(X ǫt)dt+∇v(X ǫt) ·N ǫtdηǫt]
≥ Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
H(X ǫt)dt+ (1− 3ǫ)
[
(N ǫt)
+ ·K+α + (N ǫt)− ·K+α
]
dηǫt
]
= Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
H(X ǫt)dt+
[
(N ǫt)
+ ·K+α + (N ǫt)− ·K+α
]
dηǫt
]
−3ǫEx
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
(N ǫt)
+ ·K+α + (N ǫt)− ·K+α
]
dηǫt
≥ Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
H(X ǫt)dt+
[
(N ǫt)
+ ·K+α + (N ǫt)− ·K+α
]
dηǫt
]
−3ǫKmaxEx
∫ ∞
0
e−αtdηǫt ,
where N ǫ(x) = γǫ(x) on Sǫ, K+α := (α1K1,+, · · · , αNKN,+), K−α := (α1K1,−, · · · , αNKN,−) and
Kmax = max1≤i≤N{αiK+i , αiK−i }.
Moreover, there exists constant C > 0 such that Ex
[∫∞
0 e
−αtdηǫt
] ≤ C for all ǫ < 12 . Hence
v(x) ≥ J(x;ξ ǫt)− 3ǫCKmax.
As ǫk → 0, J(x;ξǫt)→ v(x) .
Step 3: Existence and uniqueness of optimal control. Now we show that if J(x;ξ ǫ)→ v(x)
as ǫ→ 0, then ξǫt (ω) converges under measure mT on ([0, T ]×Ω,B[0, T ]×F). Furthermore, there
exists an unique optimal policy ξ∗ which is the limit of a subsequence of {ξ ǫ}ǫ.
The existence follows from an appropriate modification of Theorem 4.5 and Corollary 4.11 in
[35], as below. From [35], if (N ǫk , ξ ǫk) is a sequence of ǫk−optimal policies for x and limk→∞ ǫk →
0, then one can extract a subsequence ǫk′ such that
ξ
ǫk′
t =
∫ t
0
N
ǫk′
s dη
ǫk′
s → ξ∗t , (3.39)
under Leb× P for almost all (t, ω), where Leb is the Lebesgue measure on [0,∞).
By the analysis in Step 1 and Step 2, there exits a sequence of ǫk−optimal policy and ǫk → 0
when k →∞. Therefore, the optimal control exists. Let
A =
{
ω |X ǫk′t (ω) ∈ Cǫk′ for all 0 ≤ t <∞ and all k′ ≥ 0
}
,
then by definition (3.38), P (A) = 1. Also define
B =
{
ω |X ǫk′t →X t a.e. Leb on [0,∞)
}
,
then by (3.39), P (B) = 1. For all ω ∈ A ∩B, since CN is closed,
X t(ω) ∈ CN Leb a.e. on [0,∞).
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It remains to show the uniqueness of the optimal control. This is done by a contradiction
argument. Suppose that there are two optimal controls {ξ∗}t≥0 and {ξ∗∗}t≥0 such that ξ∗ 6= ξ∗∗
almost surely. Let {X ∗t}t≥0 and {X ∗∗t }t≥0 be the corresponding trajectories. Let ξ t = ξ
∗
t+ξ
∗∗
t
2 and
X t =
X∗t+X
∗∗
t
2 . Then by Assumption A3,
v(x)− J(x;ξ t) = (J(x;ξ
∗) + J(x;ξ∗∗))
2
− J(x;ξ)
≥ E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
H(X ∗t ) +H(X ∗∗t )
2
−H
(
X ∗t +X ∗∗t
2
)
dt > 0.
Therefore v(x) > J(x;ξ), which contradicts the optimality of {ξ∗}t≥0 and {ξ∗∗}t≥0. Hence the
uniqueness of the optimal control.
Step 4: On pushing directions when x ∈ CN . Finally, take the smooth function φǫ in (3.34)
and the smooth version of value function vǫ in (3.35). Let Hǫ(x) = φǫ ∗ H(x). From the HJB
Equation (3.1),
αv − Lv ≤ H, β(∇v) ≤ 1 in RN ,
and
αvǫ − Lvǫ ≤ Hǫ, β(∇vǫ) ≤ 1 in RN . (3.40)
Letting T > 0 and applying Meyer’s version of Itô’s formula [36, Theorem 21] to e−αtvǫ(x) and
any semi-martingale {X t}t≥0 under admissible control (ξi,+, ξi,−)Ni=1 yield
Ex
[
e−αT vǫ(XT )
]
= vǫ(x) + Ex
∫ T
0
e−αT (Lvǫ − αvǫ) (X t)dt
+ Ex
∫ T
0
e−αT∇vǫ(X t) · dξ t
+ Ex
∫ T
0
∑
0≤t<T
e−αt(vǫ(X t)− vǫ(X t−)−∇vǫ(X t)(ξ t − ξ t−)),
with the last term coming from the jumps of X t. By (3.40),
Ex
[
e−αT vǫ(XT )
]
+ Ex
∫ T
0
e−αTHǫ(X t)dt− Ex
∫ T
0
e−αT∇vǫ(X t) · dξ t
+Ex
∫ T
0
∑
0≤t<T
e−αt(−vǫ(X t) + vǫ(X t−) +∇vǫ(X t) · (ξ t − ξ t−)) ≥ vǫ(x).
(3.41)
Moreover, Hǫ, vǫ are bounded uniformly on CN for ǫ < 1 because v, ∇v, D2v are bounded on
BR(0), with CN ⊂ BR−1(0), thus
vǫ → v, ∇vǫ → ∇v, Hǫ → H uniformly in CN .
Meanwhile, for ∀x ∈ CN ,
v(x) = Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
H(X ∗t )dt+
[
(N ∗t )
+ ·K+α + (N ∗t )− ·K−α
]
dη∗t
]
, (3.42)
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where X ∗t = x +µt+ σB t + ξ∗t with ξ∗t :=
∫ t
0 N
∗
sdη
∗
s the optimal control. In particular,
Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αtdη∗t <∞, (3.43)
which leads to
Ex
∫ T
0
e−αt
[
(N ∗t )
+ ·K+α + (N ∗t )− ·K−α
]
dη∗t <∞.
By the bounded convergence theorem and (3.41),
Ex
[
e−αT v(X ∗T )
]
+ Ex
∫ T
0
e−αTH(X ∗t )dt− Ex
∫ T
0
e−αT∇v(X ∗t ) ·N ∗t dηt
+Ex
∫ T
0
∑
0≤t<T
e−αt
(−v(X ∗t ) + vǫ(X ∗t−) +∇v(X ∗t ) ·N ∗t (η∗t − η∗t−)) ≥ v(x). (3.44)
The last term on the left-hand side is nonpositive because of convexity of v, hence
Ex
[
e−αT v(X ∗T )
]
+ Ex
∫ T
0
e−αTH(X ∗t )dt− Ex
∫ T
0
e−αT∇v(X ∗t ) ·N ∗t dη∗t ≥ v(x).
Letting T →∞, by the boundedness of X ∗t , β(∇v) ≤ 1, |N ∗t | = 1, and (3.43),
Ex
∫ T
0
e−αTH(X ∗t )dt− Ex
∫ T
0
e−αT∇v(X ∗t ) ·N ∗tdη∗t ≥ v(x).
Along with (3.42), we have
0 ≥ Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
([∇v(X ∗t ) +K+α ] · (N ∗t )+dη∗t + [−∇v(X ∗t ) +K−α ] · (N ∗t )−dη∗t ) .
Given β(∇v) ≤ 1, we have −K+i ≤ vxi(x) ≤ K−i , ∀x ∈ RN and i = 1, 2, · · · , N. Hence
0 ≥ Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
([∇v(X ∗t ) +K+α ] · (N ∗t )+dη∗t + [−∇v(X ∗t ) +K−α ] · (N ∗t )−dη∗t ) ≥ 0.
This implies dη∗t = 0 when β(∇v(X ∗t )) < 1 a.e. in t. Also, when dη∗t 6= 0, N ∗t (x) ∈ r(x) for x ∈ S
a.e. for t ∈ [0,∞), where the reflection cone r(x) is defined in (3.33).
3.2.2 PO strategy when x /∈ CN
When x /∈ CN , the optimal policy is to jump immediately to some point xˆ ∈ CN and then follows
the optimal policy in CN . We will need the following assumption so that the reflection field of
the Skorokhod problem is extendable to the RN plane (Dupuis and Ishii [15]). Note that when
N = 2, A5 follows directly from Assumptions A1-A3.
A5. There is a map π : RN → CN satisfying π(x) = x for all x ∈ CN and πǫ(x)−x ∈ r(π(x)).
A5 is also assumed in [15, Assumption 3.1].
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Theorem 8. Given A1-A3, and A5. For any x /∈ CN , there exists an optimal policy π such that
π(x) ∈ ∂CN at time 0 and
v(x) = v(π(x)) + ‖x − π(x)‖.
Proof. Define l(y) =
∑
i li(yi), where
li(yi) =
{
K−i yi if yi ≥ 0,
−K+i yi if yi < 0.
(3.45)
Notice that l(y) is convex and
li(yi) = max
−K+
i
≤k≤K−
i
{kyi} = max{−K+i yi,K−i yi} for yi ∈ R.
Here we define two linear approximations which correspond to the lower and the upper bounds of
the value function v(x), respectively.
For x 6∈ CN , define
u1(x) = v(π(x)) +∇v(π(x))(x − π(x)),
u2(x) = v(π(x)) + l(x − π(x)). (3.46)
Then u2(x) ≥ v(x) by the sub-optimality of the strategy, and u1(x) ≤ v(x) by convexity. Thus,
u1(x) ≤ v(x) ≤ u2(x). (3.47)
We now show u1(x) = u2(x). By Assumption A5, u1 and u2 in (3.46) can be rewritten as
u1(x) = v(π(x)) +∇v(π(x)) · d(π(x))‖x − π(x)‖,
u2(x) = v(π(x)) +Kα(π(x)) · d(π(x))‖x − π(x)‖.
where d(π(x)) ∈ r(π(x)), Kα(x) = (K1, · · · ,KN )(x), and
Ki(x) = αiK
+
i 1(∇v(x) < 0) + αiK−i 1(∇v(x) > 0).
Therefore u1(x) = u2(x).
Combining Theorems 7 and 8, we have
Theorem 9 (PO Solution). Under Assumptions A1-A5, there exists a unique solution to control
problem (2.4) and the dynamics under the optimal control is a solution to a Skorokhod problem
(6). Moreover, fix any weight α ∈ {b | b ∈ RN++ and
∑N
i=1 bi = 1}, this optimal control is a PO
strategy to game (N-player). The set of POs forms a Pareto frontier parameterized by α.
4 PO vs MFC
In this section, we characterize the precise relation between the PO value and its corresponding
MFC problem.
To start, take the N -player game (N-player). In addition to AssumptionsA1−A3, we specify
hi to be of the form hi(x) = h(xi, x¯−i) where x¯−i = 1N−1
∑
j 6=i x
j for all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ N . This
is to be consistent with the standard formulation in MFC problems, where each player interacts
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with other players only through the empirical distribution (see [31] and [37]). Further assume that
K+i = K
−
i = K0 > 0.
Denote ∇kh(y1, y2) = ∂ykh(y1, y2) and ∇2ksh(y1, y2) = ∂2ykysh(y1, y2) for k, s = 1, 2. We
assume that there exists a constant K˜ > 0 such that
|∇2h(y1, y2)| ≤ K˜(|y1|+ |y2|).
The analysis here takes the equivalent form explained in Remark 3 such that each player starts
with a random initial position Xi0− = Z
i (i = 1, 2, · · · , N) and we assume Z1, · · · , ZN ∼ PZ
are IID. For ease of reference, we call this game (N-player-B). By symmetry, in this game
PXi∗t
= P
Xj∗t
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N and t ≥ 0, where Xi∗t and Xj∗t are dynamics of player i and j
under the (unique) PO strategy by Theorem 9.
Letting N →∞, then the corresponding MFC problem takes the form
u(PZ) := inf
(ξ+,ξ−)∈U
JMFC(ξ
+
t , ξ
−
t )
:= inf
(ξ+,ξ−)∈U
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αt
[
h (Xt,E[Xt]) dt+K0dξ
+
t +K0dξ
−
t
]
,
such that
dXt = µdt+ σdBt + dξ
+
t − dξ−t , PX0− = PZ ∈ P(R),
(4.1)
for any Z ∈ L2(R). Here P(R) is the probability measure on R. The admissible control set U is
defined as
U ={(ξ+t , ξ−t ) ∣∣ ξ+t and ξ−t are Ft-progressively measurable, càdlàg, non-decreasing,
with E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtdξ+t
]
<∞, E
[∫ ∞
0
e−αtdξ−t
]
<∞, ξ+0− = 0, ξ−0− = 0
}
.
Similar to the set up in Section 2, we look for Markovian type time-independent controls.
Theorem 10 (MFC Approximation for PO). Assume A1-A5. Denote ξ∗ := (ξ1∗, · · · , ξN∗) as
the PO strategy to (N-player-B). In addition, denote ξ¯ := (ξ¯1, . . . , ξ¯N ) where ξ¯i is the solution
to the MFC problem (4.1) (i = 1, 2, · · · , N). Assume ξ¯i is also a reflected type with D0 > 0 such
that
P(|X¯it | ≤ D0) = 1,
where X¯it is dynamics under control ξ¯
i. Define
dN :=
∫ ∞
0
e−αtE
(
Xi∗t − E[Xi∗t ]
) (
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
dt, (4.2)
for any i 6= j. Then∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
EZJ
i (Z ;ξ∗)− 1
N
N∑
i=1
EZJ
i
(
Z ; ξ¯
)∣∣∣∣∣ = O
(
|dN |+ D
2
N
N
+DN
√
D2N
N
+ |dN |+ D
2
0√
N
)
,
where Z := (Z1, · · · , ZN ), Z1, · · · , ZN ∼ PZ are IID, and DN = Diam(CN ) is the diameter of
CN .
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Remark 11. Note that the assumption on ξ¯i with P(|X¯it | ≤ D0) = 1 is common in the literature
of singular controls. For instance, [24, 25] showed that the optimal control is of a bang-bang type
for McKean-Vlasov dynamics over a finite time horizon.
Proof. Take controlled dynamics X ∗t under PO strategy ξ∗t , then it is easy to check that PXi∗t =
P
Xj∗t
for i 6= j due to the symmetry of game. By Taylor expansion, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
h
(
Xi∗t ,
∑
j 6=iX
j∗
t
N − 1
)
= h
(
Xi∗t ,E[X
i∗
t ]
)
+∇2h
(
Xi∗t ,E[X
i∗
t ]
)
∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1


+∇222
h(Xi∗t , U it )
2


∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1


2
,
where U it ∈
[
min
{
1
N
∑
j 6=iX
j∗
t ,E[X
i∗
t ]
}
,max
{
1
N
∑
j 6=iX
j∗
t ,E[X
i∗
t ]
}]
. Clearly,
E




∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1


2

 = E
[
X1∗t − E[X1∗t ]
]2
N − 1 +
N − 2
N − 1E
[(
X1∗t − E[X1∗t ]
) (
X2∗t − E[X2∗t ]
)]
and
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤

E


∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1


2


1/2
.
Therefore
h
(
Xi∗t ,X
−i∗
t
)
= h
(
Xi∗t ,E[X
i∗
t ]
)
+∇2h
(
Xi∗t ,E[X
i∗
t ]
)
∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1


+∇222
h(Xi∗t , U it )
2


∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1


2
≤ h (Xi∗t ,E[Xi∗t ])+ 2K˜DN
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
K
2


∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1


2
,
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and similarly,
h
(
Xi∗t ,X
−i∗
t
)
≥ h (Xi∗t ,E[Xi∗t ])−2K˜DN
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−K
2


∑
j 6=i
(
Xj∗t − E[Xj∗t ]
)
N − 1


2
.
Therefore,
1
N
N∑
i=1
EZJ
i (Z ;ξ∗)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
E
∫ ∞
s
e−αt
[
h
(
Xi∗t ,E[X
i∗
t ]
)
dt+K0dξ
i∗,+
t +K0dξ
i∗,−
t
])
+O
(
|dN |+ D
2
N
N
+DN
√
D2N
N
+ |dN |
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
JMFC(ξ
i∗,+, ξi∗,−) +O
(
|dN |+ D
2
N
N
+DN
√
D2N
N
+ |dN |
)
≥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
JMFC(ξ¯
i,+, ξ¯i,−) +O
(
|dN |+ D
2
N
N
+DN
√
D2N
N
+ |dN |
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
E
∫ ∞
s
e−αt
[
h
(
X¯it ,E[X¯
i
t ]
)
dt+K0dξ¯
i,+
t +K0dξ¯
i,−
t
])
+O
(
|dN |+ D
2
N
N
+DN
√
D2N
N
+ |dN |
)
, (4.3)
where X¯ t is the dynamics under MFC ξ¯ .
For X¯ t,
h
(
X¯it ,
∑
j 6=i X¯
j
t
N − 1
)
= h
(
X¯it ,E[X¯
i
t ]
)
+∇2h
(
X¯it ,E[X¯
i
t ]
)
∑
j 6=i
(
X¯jt − E[X¯jt ]
)
N − 1


+∇222
h(Xi∗t , U¯ it )
2


∑
j 6=i
(
X¯jt − E[X¯jt ]
)
N − 1


2
,
where U¯ it ∈
[
min
{
1
N
∑
j 6=i X¯
j
t ,E[X¯
i
t ]
}
,max
{
1
N
∑
j 6=i X¯
j
t ,E[X¯
i
t ]
}]
. Since {X¯it}t∈[0,T ] and {X¯jt }t∈[0,T ]
are independent for j 6= i,
E


∑
j 6=i
(
X¯jt − E[X¯jt ]
)
N − 1


2
=
E
[
X¯1t − E[X¯1t ]
]2
N − 1 .
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Recall that |X¯jt | ≤ D0 for all j = 1, 2, · · · , N . Therefore we have
1
N
N∑
i=1
EZJ
i
(
Z ; ξ¯
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
E
∫ ∞
s
e−αt
[
h
(
X¯it ,E[X¯
i
t ]
)
dt+K0dξ¯
i,+
t +K0dξ¯
i,−
t
])
+O
(
D20√
N
)
. (4.4)
Combining (4.3) and (4.4) gives us the result.
Remark 12. Theorem 10 characterizes analytically the precise difference between an N -player
stochastic game under the PO criterion and its corresponding MFC problem. This helps to unveil
the myth why these problems are often identified as one. Indeed, this identification would be correct
in the sense of approximation, if for instance DN were uniformed bounded and if one assumed
dN → 0 as N → ∞. Note that this latter assumption of a weak correlation among players is
commonly used for FC problems ([7]). However, in general it is unclear a priori whether DN
would be uniformed bounded in some order of N .
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